The ability of a group of adults with high functioning autism (HFA) or Asperger Syndrome (AS) to distinguish moral, conventional and disgust transgressions was investigated using a set of six transgression scenarios, each of which was followed by questions about permissibility, seriousness, authority contingency and justification. The results showed that although individuals with HFA or AS (HFA/AS) were able to distinguish affect-backed norms from conventional affect-neutral norms along the dimensions of permissibility, seriousness and authority-dependence, they failed to distinguish moral and disgust transgressions along the seriousness dimension and were unable to provide appropriate welfare-based moral justifications. Moreover, they judged conventional and disgust transgressions to be more serious than did the comparison group, and the correlation analysis revealed that the seriousness rating was related to their ToM impairment. We concluded that difficulties providing appropriate moral justifications and evaluating the seriousness of transgressions in individuals with HFA/AS may be explained by an impaired cognitive appraisal system that, while responsive to rule violations, fails to use relevant information about the agent's intentions and the affective impact of the action outcome in conscious moral reasoning.
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Introduction
Autism spectrum disorders (ASDs) are pervasive developmental disorders characterized by abnormal social interaction, verbal and non-verbal communication problems, and restricted interests. Moral reasoning is a key feature of social cognition. Thus, assessing whether individuals with ASDs have intact abilities to express and justify moral judgments is crucial for establishing the nature and the extent of their social impairments. Surprisingly, however, moral cognition has rarely been investigated in individuals with ASDs.
Research on moral cognition in subjects with typical development has focused on two perspectives. The first perspective claims that moral judgment is the product of conscious, effortful and sophisticated reasoning on the basis of explicit abstract principles (Piaget, 1965 (Piaget, /1932 Kohlberg, 1981) ; the second one relies on the assumption that morality takes the form of intuitions, accomplished by rapid, automatic, and unconscious affective responses (Haidt, 2001 ). In contrast with the 'conscious reasoning' perspective (Kohlberg, 1981) , Haidt (2001) showed that when people are confronted with moral scenarios they engage in a process called 'moral dumbfounding' in which they are unable to articulate sufficient justifications for their confidently expressed moral judgments (Haidt, 0010-0277/$ -see front matter Ó 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2011.06.004
